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Chapter 7

The Suggestibility of Older
Witnesses
Brian H. Bornstein, Christy J. Witt, Katie E.
Cherry, and Edith Greene

R

esearch focusing on the accuracy of older eyewitnesses has
primarily addressed their ability to describe details of a crime
and their ability to recognize the crime’s perpetrator. In general, they tend to perform somewhat worse than younger adults with
respect to describing a crime’s details, and they are also more likely to
make false identifications (Yarmey, 1996; this volume). However, the
magnitude of any age difference depends in part on how memory is
tested. For example, older witnesses are disadvantaged more on tasks
requiring free recall than on those merely requiring recognition of
either event details or faces (Bornstein, 1995).
One of the most heavily investigated factors regarding eyewitness
memory is the effect of giving witnesses misleading information after an
event has occurred (Loftus, 1992). Loftus and her colleagues have demonstrated that participants’ reported memory for an event is negatively
influenced by false information concerning the event that is suggested to
them after the event has taken place (Loftus, Miller, & Burns, 1978). A
typical misinformation effect experiment has participants witness some
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event, such as an automobile accident (Loftus et al., 1978). In subsequent
questioning about the event, misleading information is implied to some
participants (e.g., that there was a stop sign rather than a yield sign).
When tested on their recognition memory for the event, misled
participants are more likely than control participants to identify the
picture containing the misleading information. In other words, they are
less likely to report what they actually saw, showing a greater tendency
to report something that was merely suggested to them afterward.
Are older adult witnesses more suggestible than younger adults?
There are reasons to suspect that they would be. The misinformation
effect can be explained in terms of “source monitoring,” which refers to
judgments about the origin, or source, of information, as opposed to
remembering the information itself (Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay,
1993). According to Lindsay and Johnson (1989), the misinformation
effect reflects a failure of source monitoring. Specifically, an eyewitness acquires information about an event from two sources: by observing the event itself, and from subsequent suggestion. When witnesses
then falsely remember a piece of information as part of the event, rather
than as a suggestion, they have committed a source monitoring error
(Belli, Lindsay, Gales, & McCarthy, 1994; Lindsay & Johnson, 1989).
The source-monitoring approach is particularly relevant to studying
memory in older eyewitnesses because of the effect of aging on this
specific type of memory task. Compared to young adults, older persons
have difficulty remembering the source of information (e.g., Hashtroudi, Johnson, & Chrosniak, 1989; Schacter, Kaszniak, Kihlstrom, & Valdiserri, 1991). Cohen and Faulkner (1989) applied these findings to an
eyewitness situation by showing participants a film of a kidnapping,
and then presenting them with a narrative containing misleading details. When tested on their memory of the film, older participants (M
age = 70) were significantly more likely than younger participants (M
age = 35) to have been misled by suggestive information that was in the
narrative. Loftus, Levidow, and Duensing (1992) also found a tendency
for older participants (over age 65) to be more suggestible than younger
adults when remembering details of a videotaped crime, which is
consistent with older adults’ impaired ability to discriminate between
different sources of information.
However, a recent study by Coxon and Valentine (1997) suggests
that older witnesses may not be at such a disadvantage. They compared
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the suggestibility of children (M age = 8), young adults (M age = 17),
and older adults (M age = 70). All participants watched a videotape of a
kidnapping, following which they answered a number of questions
about the video. For half of the participants, four of these questions
contained misleading information (e.g., they were asked “Which arm
was the kidnapper wearing her watch on?” when she had not actually
been wearing a watch). The other (control) participants did not receive
any misleading information. All participants were then asked 20 specific questions about the video, four of which assessed whether they
accepted the misinformation.
Overall memory performance (i.e., total questions answered correctly) was worse in both older adults and children than in young
adults. However, on the questions testing for misinformation acceptance, older participants in the control condition answered an average
of 66% of the questions correctly, as opposed to 50% in the misled
condition; whereas the figures for the young adults were 77% (control)
versus 52% (misled).Not only were the older adults not more suggestible than young adults, but they were actually less suggestible: They
were the only age group not to show a statistically significant misinformation effect.
Individual differences in educational attainment and verbal ability
among the older adult samples may have contributed to these discrepant findings. Previous research in the cognitive aging literature has
demonstrated that the magnitude of age-related deficits in performance
on a variety of cognitive tasks tends to be smaller for higher ability
older people who are well educated and socially active, relative to their
lower ability counterparts (Cherry & LeCompte, 1999; Cherry & Park,
1993). Coxon and Valentine’s (1997) participants were relatively
highly educated (M education = 14 yrs), whereas the participants used
by Loftus et al. (1992) were much more diverse (Cohen & Faulkner,
1989, do not provide demographic data on their older group).
The present study compares younger and older adult witnesses’
susceptibility to misinformation. Previous research on the misinformation effect has not measured the relationship between the effect and
individuals’ perceptions of their own memory abilities. Such perceptions, and general knowledge of one’s own memory processes, are
referred to as “metamemory.” In order to examine the relationship between metamemory and the misinformation effect in the present study,
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participants also completed a questionnaire that assessed their perception of their memory functioning. Although older persons tend to perceive their memories as being faulty, the correlation between selfassessment of memory abilities and actual memory performance is
relatively low (Zelinski, Gilewski, & Thompson, 1980). We therefore
predicted that there would be a negligible relationship between participants’ self-assessed memory functioning and whether or not they were
susceptible to misinformation, for both younger and older adults.

Method

Participants
A total of 80 people participated in the study. There were 40 undergraduates from Louisiana State University (M age = 20.3, SD = 1.6,
Mdn = 20.0) and 40 older adults (M age = 69.0, SD = 5.3, Mdn = 70.0).
Of the younger adults, 32 were female and 8 were male; of the older
adults, 26 were female and 14 were male. Younger adults participated
in the study in exchange for class credit. Older adults were volunteers
from the community and were paid $5.00 for their participation.
Participants’ education level was classified as high school, some
college education, bachelor’s degree, or post-graduate education. Nearly all undergraduate participants were in the “some college” category;
of the older adults, 87.5% had had some college education, and 65%
had at least a bachelor’s degree. Thus, the two groups were comparable
in terms of education, with the older adults being perhaps slightly better
educated on average.
Most participants rated their health (OARS, Duke University,
1975) as good to excellent. Three older adults and two younger adults
rated their health as fair; no participants rated their health as poor. The
Gardner and Monge (1977) 30-Point Word Familiarity Survey was
given as a measure of verbal ability. The older adults’ mean verbal
score (M = 21.18, SD = 5.72) was significantly higher than the younger
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adults’ score (M = 12.53, SD = 3.86), t(78) = 7.93, p <.001), a typical
finding in the cognitive aging literature (e.g., Salthouse, 1988). All
participants possessed at least 20/30 corrected binocular acuity,
assessed with a standard Snellen eye chart.
Design
Age (young vs. old) was factorially crossed with two information conditions (control vs. misled). Twenty participants were tested in each
between-group condition.
Materials and Procedure
Participants were tested in small groups of up to four individuals. During the orientation task, a slide of a woman was presented briefly (5
sec), followed by four questions concerning details of the slide. The
witnessed event consisted of 22 slides of an accident in which a pedestrian is hit by a car. The slides were the same as those used by Loftus et
al. (1978), and the basic procedure was also very similar. Participants
were told to study the slide sequence in preparation for a memory test.
The series of slides, presented for three seconds each, depicts a red
automobile approaching an intersection at which half of the participants
saw a stop sign and half saw a yield sign as the critical slide. The critical slide appeared as the ninth slide. Following this critical slide, the
car turns right and then hits a pedestrian as he attempts to cross the
street.
Immediately following the slide presentation, participants answered 20 questions concerning details of the events depicted in the
slide series. As one of the questions, half of the participants were
asked: “Did another car pass the red sports car while it was stopped at
the stop sign?” The remaining participants were asked: “Did another
car pass the red sports car while it was stopped at the yield sign?” The
participants were randomly assigned to conditions in such a way that
half of the participants were exposed to information that was consistent
with what they had seen during the slide presentation (the control condition), whereas the other half were given information that was inconsistent with what they had seen during the slide presentation (the misled
condition).
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The participants then engaged in a 20-minute filler activity, which
consisted of completing a demographic questionnaire and the vocabulary test. Afterward, they completed a forced-choice recognition test
containing 10 pairs of slides, in which one slide had previously been
presented during the first part of the study while the other slide had not.
Each slide pair was presented for 8 seconds and was counterbalanced
for left/right side presentation. The critical slide pair (i.e., the intersection with the stop and yield signs) appeared in position 6 for all
participants.
Following the forced-choice recognition task, participants completed the Memory Functioning Questionnaire (Gilewski, Zelinski, &
Schaie, 1990), a self-assessment measure of metamemory. The MFQ
contains 64 items related to memory functioning that are rated on a 7-pt
scale (e.g., “How well do you remember things that occurred last
month?”). It consists of 4 subtests, measuring the general frequency of
forgetting, the seriousness of forgetting in various situations, retrospective functioning (i.e., current compared to prior functioning), and frequency of mnemonics usage.

Results
Analyses of variance were performed on the data using age (young,
old) and information condition (control, misled) as independent variables. Accuracy on the critical slide was scored as either 0 (incorrect)
or 1 (correct).
Detail Questions
Twenty questions, which did not pertain to participants’ susceptibility
to misinformation, tapped their overall memory for details in the slides.
A main effect of age was obtained for this overall score, F(1, 76) =
6.57, p <.01. The younger adults (M = 15.3, SD = 1.7) were more accurate on these questions than the older adults (M = 14.3, SD = 1.8). No
other main effects or interactions were observed, Fs(1, 76) < 1.35.
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Forced-Choice Recognition Test
A marginal main effect of information condition was found for the
overall score on the forced-choice recognition test, F(1, 76) = 3.33, p
<.07, with participants in the control condition answering slightly more
questions correctly (M = 9.05/10, SD = 0.88) than participants in the
misled condition (M = 8.65/10, SD = 1.08). No other main effects or
interactions were observed, F(1, 76) < 1.87. Critical Slide Recognition
Performance on the critical slide is shown in Figure 7.1. There was a
main effect of information condition on recognition of the critical slide,
F(1, 76) = 5.29, p <.02. Ninety percent of participants in the control
condition were correct on this item, compared to 70% of participants in
the misled condition. This finding indicates that we did obtain a misinformation effect across all participants. There was no main effect of age
F(1, 76) = 0.33, nor was the interaction of age and information
condition significant F(1, 76) = 2.97.

FIGURE 7.1 Percentage of older and younger participants giving the
correct answer on the critical (misinformation) slide.
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With regard only to the younger adults, a significant difference was
found between those in the control condition (100% correct) compared
to those in the misled condition (65% correct), F(1, 38) = 10.23, p <
.005. Considering only the older adults, however, this difference was
not found. Older adults in the control condition (80% correct) were not
significantly more accurate on the critical slide than older adults in the
misled condition (75% correct).Thus, a statistically significant misinformation effect was found for the younger but not for the older participants.
Individual Differences and Memory Performance
Education
There was no significant correlation between participants’ education
level and either their total recognition score, r = .06, or their accuracy
on the critical slide, r = .00. Likewise, neither measure of participants,
memory performance was significantly correlated with their verbal
ability, rs < .1.
Memory Functioning Questionnaire
Table 7.1 shows the mean MFQ scores for both age groups. A main
effect of age was found for the subtest of metamemory questions concerning retrospective functioning, F(1, 76) = 34.52, p < .001. Younger
participants (M = 23.8, SD = 4.1) scored higher on this subset of questions than the older adults (M = 17.4, SD = 5.5). There were no age
differences for the other three components of the MFQ, F(1, 76)s ≤ 1.65.
The four subtests of the metamemory questionnaire were highly
intercorrelated. However, the metamemory subtest scores were correlated with neither participants’ performance on the detail questions
nor their accuracy on the critical slide in the forced-choice recognition test. The first subtest of metamemory questions, concerning the
general frequency of forgetting, was correlated with the overall score
on the forced-choice recognition test, r = 0.23, p <.05 for all participants. Broken down by age, this correlation was significant for older,
r = 0.35, p < .05, but not for younger participants.
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TABLE 7.1 Mean Scores (and Standard Deviations) on the Four Subtests
of the MFQ, As a Function of Participant Age
Age
Subtest

Younger adults

1. General frequency of forgetting
2. Seriousness of forgetting
3. Retrospective functioninga
4. Mnemonics usage

166.2
(25.0)
75.4
(22.8)
23.8
(4.1)
25.5
(9.5)

Older adults
163.1
(23.8)
80.3
(23.0)
17.4
(5.4)
22.5
(11.0)

Note. The number of items on the different subtests was: 33 on Subtest 1; 18 on Subtest 2; 5 on
Subtest 3; and 8 on Subtest 4. For the younger adults, responses on Subtests 1 and 4 were
correlated, r = 0.39, p <.01. For the older adults, responses on Subtest 1 were correlated with
responses on Subtest 2, r = 0.46, p <.005, and on Subtest 4, r = 0.46, p <.005. Additionally,
responses on Subtest 2 were correlated with responses on Subtest 4, r = 0.34, p <.05, for the older
adults.
a
The difference between older and younger adults on this subtest was statistically significant,
p <.001.

Discussion and Implications
Despite research showing that aging is associated with source monitoring deficits (Hashtroudi et al., 1989), the effect of misleading suggestions was not greater in older participants than in younger adults. In
fact, older witnesses failed to demonstrate a misinformation effect,
while the effect was detected in younger witnesses. The absence of a
misinformation effect in older participants is largely due to their poorer
performance in the control condition (80% correct, vs. 100% for
younger participants); yet it was nonetheless the case that older participants in the misled condition actually did somewhat better than their
younger counterparts (75% vs. 65% correct).
Although some previous research has found an enhanced misinformation effect in older witnesses (Cohen & Faulkner, 1989; Loftus
et al., 1992), the present results are consistent with other research that
has failed to find such an effect (Coxon & Valentine, 1997). Older
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participants in the present study had high verbal ability and were
relatively highly educated, supporting the interpretation that older
witnesses with a relatively high level of cognitive functioning appear
not to be especially suggestible (cf. Coxon & Valentine, 1997).
Although education level was not correlated with participants, eyewitness memory performance, both groups of participants were relatively
homogeneous in terms of education. Because cognitive decrements in
aging are related to education (Cherry & LeCompte, in press; Cherry
& Park, 1993), future research on the suggestibility of older witnesses
needs to compare older witnesses who differ in overall ability level.
In general, older eyewitnesses—even those with relatively high
cognitive functioning—do indeed tend to remember less information
than younger witnesses (Coxon & Valentine, 1997). However, there is
a lack of conclusive evidence to suggest that age exacerbates the
negative influence of various factors on eyewitness memory, such as
the presence of a weapon (O’Rourke, Penrod, Cutler, & Stuve, 1989)
or misinformation.
Older participants were somewhat more likely to report problems
in memory functioning. However, consistent with previous research
(e.g., Zelinski et al., 1980), participants’ metamemory evaluations were
not correlated with their actual performance, in this case whether or not
they demonstrated a misinformation effect. This lack of a relationship
between memory performance and metamemory was observed for both
age groups, though older adults who reported more frequent forgetting
did tend to recognize fewer slides correctly. It is important to point out
that although the metamemory questionnaire used in the present study
covered various aspects of memory functioning, it did not specifically
address participants’ beliefs about their memory abilities in an eyewitness context. It is possible that those more specific beliefs would differ
for older and younger adults, and also that they would correspond to
eyewitnesses’ actual memory performance. Additional research that
addresses this issue is called for.
The present findings have significant implications for how older
witnesses should be treated. Jurors—as well as older adults themselves—tend to hold negative stereotypes about older eyewitnesses,
encompassing their general abilities both to remember event details and
to recognize perpetrators (Bornstein, 1995; Yarmey, this volume). In
addition, Ross, Dunning, Toglia, and Ceci (1990, Expt. 3) found that
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mock jurors specifically believe older witnesses are more susceptible to
misleading information than young adult witnesses. Although there
does appear to be a “kernel of truth” in the stereotype concerning older
witnesses’ ability to describe details of a crime (Yarmey, this volume),
the findings of the present study provide no support for the perception
that older witnesses-at least those who are highly educated-are also
more suggestible than younger witnesses. In evaluating the testimony
of eyewitnesses, both jurors and law enforcement officials should
attend to the possible influence of post-event information; but they do
not need to be more concerned with its effect on older witnesses than
with its effect on the adult population at large.
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